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As a result of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the financial services 
industry came under intense government scrutiny that resulted in the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).  As part of 
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was required to 
conduct a study on the use of brokered deposits and its effect on insurance 
premiums to be completed by July 2011.  Across the banking sector, industrial 
banks are the primary users of brokered deposits and yet no industrial banks failed 
during the Great Recession.  This thesis reviews the literature on industrial banks to 
help explain how this group of banks endured the effects of the Great Recession.  A 
select data set from FDIC Call Reports will show how the existing regulation of 
brokered deposits provided the correct incentives to deter moral hazard issues that 
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As the Great Recession of 2007-2009 progressed1, the United States economy 
experienced a drop in overall economic activity in terms of GDP, employment, 
housing prices, and industrial production, among other sectors.  Given that it was 
the longest recession since World War II, the recovery process has also taken longer 
than usual.  It is not surprising that the alarming increase in the number of bank 
failures during the Great Recession captured the attention of the public in general, 
as it affected depositors, investors and, ultimately, the overall health of the 
economy.  According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)2, a total 
of 434 banks failed between 2007 and 2012.  As shown in Table 1, only three banks 
failed in 2007, but the number of bank failures increased exponentially each 
following year until a peak of 157 bank failures was reached in 20103, even though 
the Great Recession officially ended in 2009. 
                                                          
1
 The National Bureau of Economic Research provides the start and end dates of recessions in the United 
States. The official release for the Great Recession can be located at:  
http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html 
2
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation preserves and promotes public confidence in the U.S. 
financial system by insuring depositors for at least $250,000 per insured bank; by identifying, monitoring 
and addressing risks to the deposit insurance funds; and by limiting the effect on the economy and the 
financial system when a bank or thrift institution fails. For more information, visit: 
http://www.fdic.gov/about/affaq.html 
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In July of 2011, the FDIC released a study on core and brokered deposits.  
According to the study, a substantial number of banks that failed exhibited a 
common feature: the increased use of brokered deposits in the 12 quarters prior to 
failure (FDIC, 2011, p. 5).  This thesis analyzes the relationship between the use of 
brokered deposits and bank failure based on Call Report data for December of 2011.  
A series of regressions will be tested in Stata® to accomplish this objective.  This 
thesis will test the hypothesis that banks that obtain the majority of their funding 
from brokered deposits (primary users) are less likely to fail than those banks that 
utilize brokered deposits as a substitute for core deposits (secondary users).  The 
FDIC study was mainly focused on secondary users posing the greatest risk to the 


















Number of Bank Failures During and 
After the Great Recession
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deposits and bank failure were applied to all banks, regardless of their historical use 
of brokered deposits.  This is an important factor to consider, since industrial banks 
(or industrial loan corporations) have historically relied on brokered deposits to 



























In Robert Glenn Hubbard’s textbook “Money, the Financial System, and the 
Economy” (2008), the author provides an overview on the business of banking, 
including the regulatory environment and a discussion of moral hazard in banking.  
A summary of key banking terminology will be provided in this section. 
In the United States, all banks use a balance sheet to provide a snapshot of 
their current financial condition.  Banks that are supervised by the FDIC are 
required to submit quarterly Call Reports, which include a section with the 
following balance sheet items: assets, liabilities and net worth.  Hubbard (2008) 
mentions that bank assets include “cash items, funds used in securities investments, 
loans and other asset holdings” (p. 281).  Bank liabilities consist of “the funds the 
bank acquires from savers” (p. 279).  This can include checkable deposits and 
borrowings from depositors (Hubbard, 2008, p. 281).  The difference between 
assets and liabilities is the net worth of a bank.  This component is made up of “the 
capital contributed by the bank’s shareholders plus accumulated, retained profits” 
(Hubbard, 2008, p. 282).  Consequently, a bank’s net worth is dependent on the 
value of its assets and liabilities as they fluctuate over time.   
All banks take inputs (deposits), add value to them, and create outputs 
(loans) from excess reserves in order to generate profits.  Loans made to high risk 
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borrowers are more likely to reduce profits since the higher the number of loans 
that default, the more likely a bank is to fail.  Therefore, in order to remain profitable 
in the long run, a bank must manage its loan portfolio to avoid making loans to risky 
borrowers (Hubbard, 2008, p. 283-285).  
However, since the advent of deposit insurance in 1934, a moral hazard 
problem appeared.  Since all FDIC insured banks guarantee certain deposits up to 
$250,000, depositors no longer have a strong incentive to monitor a bank’s 
performance.  That responsibility has shifted to the FDIC in the form of statutes, 
regulations, and regular bank examinations to insure the safety and soundness of 
FDIC insured banks (Hubbard, 2008, p. 314-315).  Muslumov (2008) studied the 
role of full deposit insurance and moral hazard behavior in the Turkish banking 
system.  The study showed that, under this regulatory environment, banks exhibit a 
higher incidence of excessive risk-taking while a lower capital adequacy ratio is 
maintained (Muslumov, 2008, p. 2162).  
The moral hazard problem arises when banks accept greater levels of risk on 
FDIC insured deposits with the knowledge that in the event of bank failure, the FDIC 
would honor insured deposits.  A possible solution to the moral hazard problem 
would consist of requiring banks to use their own capital to fund loans in 
combination with deposits from savers (Hubbard, 2008, p. 286).  Currently, the FDIC 
controls for moral hazard issues by charging higher premiums on riskier deposits.  
This is intended to discourage banks from making loans to risky borrowers by 
increasing their costs of funds and effectively reducing expected profitability. 
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 The FDIC is funded with premiums from insured banks and investments 
earnings (Hubbard, 2008, p. 318).  The Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) is used to 
cover costs associated with bank failures.  The DIF can significantly decrease during 
recessions, but there are implicit guarantees from the Treasury Department and the 
Federal Reserve system to maintain the stability of the fund.  The FDIC does not 
receive funds from the government unless the DIF is in distress.  The premiums 
assessed to insured banks are determined on the capitalization status of each bank.  
According to Hubbard (2008), “in 2006 fees varied from $0.05 to $0.07 per $100 of 
insured deposits, according to how well-capitalized the bank was and whether bank 
examinations revealed any weakness” (p. 318).  This means that, the higher the 
premiums, the higher the probability of bank failure. 
 In summary, banks make a profit when their earnings from lending are 
greater than their funding costs after providing a service to customers.  The 
importance of banks as financial intermediaries cannot be understated given their 
key role in the health of an economy.  Banks increase the efficiency of the financial 
system by matching savers and borrowers.  Since banks specialize in gathering 
information about their borrowers, they are indeed reducing information costs, 
which encourage savings and, ultimately, greater levels of investment in the 
economy.  The moral hazard problem exacerbates the need for bank monitoring and 
regulation to minimize bank failure.  The DIF is directly affected by the rate of bank 
failures on deposits that are insured by the FDIC.  The next section will introduce 
the Morris Plan banks as financial intermediaries that introduced innovation and, 













Today’s industrial banks4 trace their roots to the Morris Plan banks of the 
early 20th century.  A literature review on Morris Plan banks shows that, from 
inception, these financial intermediaries were subject to public scrutiny and a 
degree of controversy.  
Robinson (1931) outlines how these financial intermediaries were formed 
and their innovative, yet peculiar methods, to raise capital at the time.  Morris Plan 
banks started in the 1910s and provided financing to borrowers by: 
Lending money on endorsed notes at a high rate of interest with repayment 
by installments.  The loan is discounted in advance at the legal rate of 
interest plus a commission or fee for the whole period that the loan runs, but 
the borrower starts to repay the loan the next week continuing to make a 
payment each week until the entire amount is repaid. (Robinson, 1931, p. 
223)  
 
The borrower was required to obtain the signatures of two acquaintances, whom 
guaranteed the good character of the borrower.  This method of financing solved the 
adverse selection problem that commercial banks were facing at that time, which 
reduced the availability of personal loans to the general public.  Since commercial 
banks required collateral from borrowers in order to obtain financing, many 
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potential borrowers were excluded from mainstream banking (Ergungor & 
Thomson, 2005).  Morris Plan banks filled this void by offering their loan products 
to consumers and, thus, corrected a market failure.  The financing method of Morris 
Plan banks differed from the one used by commercial banks.  In a personal loan 
from a commercial bank, monthly payments and simple interest were calculated 
during the life of the loan.  On the other hand, Morris Plan banks charged an 
additional commission or fee.   
Robinson (1931) mentioned that Morris Plan banks had three options to 
raise capital: 1. Class B certificates.  These were sold directly to borrowers while 
applying for a loan.  They usually paid a rate of 5% of savings.  Morris Plan banks 
controlled the outflow of capital by limiting payment on a 30 day notice from the 
borrower.  These certificates came to be known as thrift notes; 2. Demand deposits.  
A much cheaper option than Class B certificates but only available to state chartered 
banks; 3. Collateral trust note.  Issued by the Industrial Finance Corporation.  Funds 
were loaned to Morris Plan banks but they were not frequently used (Robinson, 
1931, p. 223-225).  It is important to highlight that, as indicated by Robinson (1931), 
“a noteworthy feature of the Morris Plan is the bid for savings” (p. 223).  Therefore, 
the Class B certificates became the primary source of funding for Morris Plan banks 
due to their lower cost and wider availability.  
Morris Plan banks continued to introduce innovation to the financial system 
by creating partnerships with retail establishments where "the store draws a Morris 
Plan retail trade acceptance upon the purchaser and this is accepted by the latter 
and endorsed by the former and then discounted at the Morris Plan bank.  The rate 
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at which the Morris Plan company discounts the trade acceptance is the legal rate 
plus a service fee or commission” (Robinson, 1931, p. 225).  Retail stores were then 
able to increase sales while meeting the needs of customers by partnering with 
Morris Plan banks.  Additionally, Morris Plan banks showed remarkable flexibility 
and willingness to try new ways to finance consumers.  This included the financing 
of automobiles, second mortgages, and even insurance plans (Robinson, 1931, p. 
226).  
As Morris Plan banks became more profitable, a monopoly concern was 
brought to court.  One of the most notable cases being David Stein vs. Arthur J. 
Morris, the Fidelity Corporation of America and the Industrial Finance Corporation in 
1914.  In this case, David Stein demanded compensation due to copyright 
infringement on the business model used by the Morris Plan banks.  The courts 
ruled against David Stein but indicated “that there are no peculiar features of the 
Morris Plan in which it has the right of sole ownership.  Anyone may use them 
without paying for them” (Robinson, 1931, p. 228).  This created a precedent that 
would eventually allow commercial banks to incorporate the Morris Plan bank 
innovations into their own line of business.  The use of borrower references in 
commercial banking today can be traced back to the Morris Plan bank model 
(Mushinki & Ronnie, 2001). 
In spite of their continued growth across the United States, Morris Plan banks 
struggled in some states to obtain a charter.  They often faced regulatory challenges 
to the rate of interest charged to borrowers.  The Uniform Small Loan Law of 1917 
was opposed by Morris Plan banks for several reasons.  The purpose of the law was 
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to curtail predatory lending, and it capped the interest rate at 42% per year 
(Robinson, 1931).  As Robinson (1931) mentioned, this law “provides that interest 
must be figured on unpaid balances, and that no fees shall be charged other than 
those required for recording instruments” (p. 229).  Since Morris Plan banks added 
a commission or fee to each loan aside from simple interest, this change in the law 
had a serious effect on their lending ability.  
In some instances, Morris Plan banks were under scrutiny due to regulatory 
perceptions as to what exactly constituted a true bank.  As Robinson (1931) stated, 
“Morris Plan concerns desire seemingly to be known as banks but they encounter 
difficulty when they seek to be incorporated under the general banking law of a 
state.  Banking commissioners seem unwilling to regard the business of a Morris 
Plan company as a true banking business, and few of these concerns are now 
operating under the banking laws of the states in which they are located” (p. 229).  
The states were clearly divided on this issue, since some of them had strict usury 
laws or rules that disqualified Morris Plan banks from obtaining a state charter 
(Robinson, 1931).    
In regards to annual interest rates charged by Morris Plan banks, Robinson 
(1931) mentioned that “When a note is discounted at 6 plus 2 or 8 per cent, and 
repaid under the terms of the Morris Plan, the actual interest is 19.2 per cent if 
account is taken of the money of which the borrower has had the full use during the 
year and of what it has actually cost him” (p. 233).  This annual interest charge 
seemed outrageous at that time to many consumer groups.  It is important to note 
that other financial intermediaries, like pawn brokers, charged anywhere between 
11 
 
12-120% per year (Robinson 1931).  In the end, Robinson (1931) concluded that 
Morris Plan banks needed to show that they indeed were stable institutions.  They 
could accomplish this by “proving how ill-adapted the usury laws are to the 
business of financing the credit needs of those without acceptable banking 
collateral” (p. 235).  As Morris Plan banks decreased information costs to borrowers 
on the apparent usurious interest rate, their marginal position in the financial 
market could have improved.  Ultimately, the decline of the Morris Plan banks as 
financial intermediaries was directly correlated with the recovery of commercial 
banking after the Great Depression, which resulted in the expansion of consumer 
credit and the growth of FDIC-insured demand deposits (Mushinki & Ronnie, 2001). 
Even though only the Morris Plan Company of Terre Haute remains from the 
once prominent group of Morris Plan banks, the industrial banks of today face 
similar challenges to their existence as financial intermediaries.  The next section 




















Industrial banks share a similar story to the one experienced by Morris Plan 
banks almost a century ago.  Industrial banks have some options to raise capital: 1. 
Brokered deposits.  A depositor obtains multiple savings accounts that are FDIC 
insured. The funds are loaned by brokerage houses to industrial banks, which then 
invest the money and repay the brokered deposit funds.  Based on FDIC Call Report 
data for December of 2011, on average, brokered deposits make up a little more 
than half of the funding sources for industrial banks.  2. TARP funds.  The Treasury 
Department set up the Trouble Asset Relief Program in 2008 as a way to provide 
liquidity to the money market during the Great Recession.  These funds are 
auctioned off amongst both commercial and industrial banks.  3. Time deposits.  
These can take the form of Certificates of Deposit or NOW (Negotiable Order of 
Withdrawal) accounts (Ergungor & Thomson, 2005).   
It is worth noting that industrial banks are not allowed to accept demand 
deposits.  Demand deposits are the least expensive method to raise capital, due to 
little or no interest that is paid on checking accounts.  Industrial banks, then, are at a 
disadvantage in terms of cost of funds when compared to commercial banks.  This is 
because, in the case of brokered deposits, industrial banks must take into account 
the broker’s fees in their pricing models. 
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In April of 2011, the Milken Institute released an extensive report on 
industrial banks, which included a list of the parent companies of industrial banks.  
Some of the current parent companies include BMW, Target, Toyota, and General 
Electric to name a few (Milken, 2011, p. 4).  This goes on to show that, just like its 
Morris Plan bank predecessors, industrial banks provide financing in a variety of 
industries such as automotive, retail, and commercial.  Lloyd (2009) mentioned that 
“only three particular assets are needed to enter the financial services market - 
capital, information technology, and distribution” (p. 217).  A corporation may have 
access to capital, but without a distribution network, such as bank branches, their 
capacity to build a customer base is limited.  This is the main reason why industrial 
banks are owned by corporations, for the sole purpose of expanding their own lines 
of business.  Therefore, it is not surprising to see that Wal-Mart applied for an 
industrial bank charter in 2006.  Wal-Mart expressed interest in obtaining an 
industrial bank charter in order to save on the costs of clearing transactions 
produced when consumers made payments.  Due to monopoly concerns from 
commercial and community banks, Wal-Mart withdrew its industrial bank charter 
application, and the FDIC imposed a moratorium on approving more industrial bank 
charters (Lloyd, 2009).   
Lloyd (2009) mentions the key concerns that surfaced when Wal-Mart 
applied for an industrial bank charter.  The most prominent one was the FDIC’s lack 
of regulatory power over the holding companies of industrial banks.  Lloyd (2009) 
argues that as long as the FDIC has sufficient regulatory powers over those holding 
companies, the industrial banks do not pose a systemic risk to the banking system.  
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Since the separation of banking and commerce has been a prominent feature in the 
economic history of the United States, the growth of industrial banks will continue 
to be restricted in the near future.  However, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999 was a milestone in the ongoing liberalization of 
the banking sector (Hubbard, 2008, p. 327). 
A more recent challenge that industrial banks currently face is related to the 
use of brokered deposits to fund new loans.  On March 18, 2011, the FDIC held a 
roundtable on the issue of core and brokered deposits as part of a report mandated 
by Dodd-Frank.  Core deposits consist mainly of demand deposits, such as checking 
and savings accounts, which a customer can request at any moment.  Brokered 
deposits are those where savers split deposits into multiple accounts in different 
banks to obtain the full FDIC insurance amount on each deposit, usually by using a 
broker (Shaffer, 2010, p. 1).  Banks that use core deposits rely on stable 
relationships with depositors to maintain a constant flow of funds and prevent bank 
runs.  Also, holders of demand deposits do not receive much in terms of interest, 
while holders of brokered deposits receive a rate that is commensurate to the risk 
taken in the institution utilizing the brokered funds.  Based on this definition of core 
and brokered deposits, it would appear that the use of brokered deposits would be 
associated with a higher likelihood of bank failure.   
The roundtable discussion, held by the FDIC on March 18, 2011, provided a 
forum for bankers, government regulators, and academics, to discuss the subject of 
core and brokered deposits.  Professor Haluk Unal from the University of Maryland 
stated that core deposits continue to be the safest way to raise capital, while 
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brokered deposits are tied to bank failure.  Also, William Isaac of LECG Global 
Financial Services provided a brief history on brokered deposits that highlighted the 
crisis of the Savings and Loans associations in the 1980s, which necessitated a 
government bailout.  Additionally, he explained how the FDIC had to place 
restrictions on brokerage houses that traded the brokered deposits in order to 
prevent them from spreading the depositor’s money into different bank accounts, 
more commonly known as “pass-through” insurance.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the FDIC’s regulation that 
eliminated “pass-through” insurance on brokered deposits (FDIC, 2011, p. 12).  
According to the Milken Institute, 21 industrial banks failed in the 1986-2003 
period but none failed in the 2004-2009 period (Milken, 2011, p. 43).  The key 
difference between the high number of failures before 2004, and the period of the 
Great Recession, is the existence of Section 29 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.  
The next section will explore this item in greater detail.  
Shaffer (2010) developed a model to study the role of reciprocal brokered 
deposits and bank performance.  Shaffer (2010) found “that banks using relatively 
more reciprocal brokered deposits face weaker market discipline and may take 
more risk in various dimensions.  To the extent that those risks are not fully priced 
in the deposit insurance premium, such a conclusion suggests that a further risk 
premium may be warranted for reciprocal brokered deposits” (p. 5).  This thesis will 
utilize a similar model with data on brokered deposits instead of reciprocal 













As stipulated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, the FDIC was required to conduct a study on core deposits 
and brokered deposits.  The study was released to the general public on July of 
2011. The scope of the study included the following five areas: 
(1) the definition of core deposits for the purpose of calculating the deposit 
insurance premiums of banks; (2) the potential impact on the Deposit 
Insurance Fund of revising the definitions of brokered deposits and core 
deposits to better distinguish between them; (3) an assessment of the 
differences between core deposits and brokered deposits and their role in 
the economy and banking sector of the United States; (4) the potential 
stimulative effect on local economies of redefining core deposits; and (5) the 
competitive parity between large banks and community banks that could 
result from redefining core deposits. (FDIC, 2011, p.2) 
The legislative implications of the FDIC study included the possibility of amending, 
or repealing, the current statute on brokered deposits as defined in Section 29 of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act).  The FDIC (2011) study defines a brokered 
deposit as a “deposit accepted through a deposit broker” (p. 5).  As stated in the FDI 
Act, a deposit broker is:  
(A) any person engaged in the business of placing deposits, or facilitating the 
placement of deposits, of third parties with insured depository institutions or 
the business of placing deposits with insured depository institutions for the 
purpose of selling interests in those deposits to third parties; and (B) an 
agent or trustee who establishes a deposit account to facilitate a business 
arrangement with an insured depository institution to use the proceeds of 
the account to fund a prearranged loan. (FDIC, 2011, p. 5)
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Section 29 specifies the following restrictions on the use of brokered deposits:  
(1) Well capitalized banks may accept brokered deposits at any time; (2) 
adequately capitalized banks may accept new brokered deposits and renew 
or roll over existing brokered deposits if they have obtained a waiver from 
the FDIC; and (3) undercapitalized banks may never accept, renew, or roll 
over brokered deposits. (FDIC, 2011, p. 6-7)  
The existing statute creates two limitations: a liquidity trap and industry stigma 
against brokered deposits.  Should a bank become less than well capitalized, the 
statute’s restrictions will worsen a bank’s financial condition, since the use of 
brokered deposits would be restricted.  Furthermore, the existence of the brokered 
deposit statute stigmatizes its use, since it is perceived as a riskier funding source, 
even for well capitalized banks.  The FDIC has expressed concern over the use of 
brokered deposits.  This is because banks are able to obtain funds that are fully 
insured by the FDIC without the traditional banking relationship with a customer 
(FDIC, 2011).  
On the other hand, the FDIC considers core deposits safer, and more reliable, 
than brokered deposits (FDIC, 2011).  Core deposits are defined as the sum of 
demand deposits (checking and savings accounts), all NOW (Negotiable Order of 
Withdrawal) and ATS (Automatic Transfer Service) accounts, MMDAs (Money 
Market Deposit Accounts), other savings deposits and time deposits under 
$250,000, minus all brokered deposits under $250,000 (FDIC, 2011, p.115).  In 
contrast with the limitations on brokered deposits, there is no statute that limits the 





 The FDIC study concluded that: 
As brokered deposit levels increase, the probability that a bank will fail also 
increases.  Banks with higher levels of brokered deposits are also, in general, 
more costly to the DIF when they do fail.  On average, brokered deposits are 
also correlated with higher levels of asset growth, higher levels of 
nonperforming loans, and a lower proportion of core deposit funding. All of 
these factors contribute to a higher likelihood of bank failure. Conversely, 
research shows that, generally, banks’ increasing reliance on core deposits 
reduces the chance of failure and reduces the DIF’s losses when banks do fail. 
(FDIC, 2011, p. 3)  
 
The FDIC recommended that no changes to the brokered deposit statute of Section 
29 be required at this time.  This was a somewhat bittersweet outcome for 
industrial banks since the liquidity trap and overall stigma due to the use of 
brokered deposits remains.  The banks that failed during the time period analyzed 
by the FDIC were not primary users of brokered deposits.  Industrial banks have 
demonstrated a lower incidence of bank failure during the Great Recession, despite 
being primary users of brokered deposits.  The next section will outline the model 
and results from a series of regressions that evaluate the performance of banks that 



















A review of the literature indicates that banks with high levels of loans to 
assets, and high delinquencies, are more likely to fail (Wheelock & Wilson, 2000).  
Additionally, core deposits are related to a higher charter value, which reduces 
losses in the event of bank failure (James, 1991).  It is estimated that bank failures 
have an average cost of 10% of total assets (James, 1991).  Consequently, a failed 
bank with a high concentration of brokered deposits will have a lower franchise 
value, which produces higher costs to the DIF (FDIC, 2011).  When banks fail, the 
use of core deposits is associated with a higher franchise value.  This is because core 
deposits are related to long standing customer relationships that present 
opportunities for growth for the acquiring bank.  Franchise value in failed banks is 
heavily influenced by Section 29 of the FDI Act.  Failed banks with high core deposits 
are preferred over those with brokered deposits, due to the industry stigma created 
by Section 29 of the FDI Act.  
Industrial banks exhibit a high concentration of brokered deposit use, since 
they cannot accept demand deposits (Ergungor & Thomson, 2005).  According to the 
econometric models used by the FDIC in the 2011 study, the use of brokered 
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deposits is associated with an increase in bank failures.  Industrial banks are thus 
expected to fail more often, and to incur greater losses to the Deposit Insurance 
Fund (FDIC, 2011).  However, no industrial banks failed in the 2007-2009 period, 






6.1 Data and Methodology 
The data sample uses information from the Call Reports submitted to the 
FDIC for the last quarter of 2011.  There were a total of 6,789 banks that reported 
data during this Call Report period.  Of those banks, 36 are industrial banks.  None of 
the 17 banks that failed in the following period were industrial banks.  The data for 
failed banks are based on their last Call Report before the FDIC was named receiver 
upon bank failure.  The remaining 6,736 banks in the sample are active commercial 
banks.  The totals for each group are provided in Table 2. 
Table 2 




Table 2 shows that industrial banks, on average, use 51% of their total 
deposits as brokered deposits, compared to about 7% for the entire data sample.  
The return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) measures are particularly 
strong for industrial banks at 3% and 26%, compared to 0.5% and 32.0% for 
commercial banks, respectively.  This strong performance is also reflected in the 
capital to assets ratio (CAR).  It appears that industrial banks are much more 
capitalized at 11.8%, compared to 1.5% for commercial banks.  
Another important figure is the leverage ratio.  In the case of industrial 
banks, their leverage ratio is lower than average at 8.44, compared to 66.69 for all 
commercial banks.  Failed banks had a leverage ratio of 15.60, which is much 
smaller than the national average at 63.89.  This is not surprising since banks that 
will soon fail have low levels of equity.  Also, it appears that aggregate liquidity in 
the form of high leverage ratios, increases during expansionary periods in the 
business cycle (Adrian & Shin, 2010).  According to Adrian and Shin (2010), during a 
business expansion “the financial intermediaries then hold surplus capital and they 
will attempt to find ways in which they can employ their surplus capital. In analogy 
with manufacturing firms, we may see the financial system as having surplus 
capacity” (pp. 37-38).  When banks have higher leverage ratios, they are more 
inclined to lend more aggressively.  This has the effect of lowering profitability, as 
adverse selection occurs when loans are given to even riskier borrowers over time 
(Adrian & Shin, 2010).  Since industrial banks are not as leveraged as commercial 
banks, this would help explain the absence of bank failures by industrial banks 
during the Great Recession.  
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Table 3 provides a description of each variable, as well as the expected 
coefficient sign for each measure.  A positive sign indicates a higher probability of 
bank failure.  The regression equation is modeled as follows5: 
                                                             
Since industrial banks are the primary users of brokered deposits, the regression 
results can shed light on the current perception of core deposits as safer than 
brokered deposits.  However, since the data set is limited to a single Call Report 
period, the results are only preliminary.  Thus, it is unclear if industrial banks are 
stable due to the use of brokered deposits, or alternatively, due to the existence of 




                                                          
5
 The derivation of the statistical methods used in this thesis can be found in Woolridge 2009: 225-299.  
Table 3
Expected Regression Coefficient Signs for All Model Variables
Variable Description Expected Sign
fb Failed Bank Intercept
roa Equity to Assets Ratio (Return on Assets) Negative
roe Net Income to Assets Ratio (Return on Equity) Negative
la Loans to Assets Ratio Positive
car Capital to Assets Ratio Negative
lev Assets to Equity Ratio (Leverage) Positive
blev Assets to Brokered Deposits Ratio Negative
bdr Brokered Deposits to Total Deposits Ratio Negative
ib Industrial Bank Negative
Notes: the ib variable is a dummy variable to test the correlation of industrial 




 Using Stata® software, the summary statistics shown in Table 4 were 
generated to show the range of values used in the regression.  The maximum value 
of the assets to brokered deposits ratio (BLEV) variable is related to the high 
occurrence of brokered deposits in failed banks (see Table 2).  The minimum value 
of the net income to assets ratio (ROE) variable is related to failed banks with 
negative equity.  The low incidence of brokered deposit use in the sample is visible 
in the mean value of the brokered deposits to total deposits ratio (BDR) variable at 
3%.  The maximum value of the capital to assets ratio (CAR) variable shows how 
some banks can cover all loans with capital while the average capital amount is 12% 
for all banks.  The loans to assets ratio (LA) variable results show that at least one 
bank in the sample is using 98% of its assets as loans.  Since a high LA ratio is 
associated with a higher likelihood of default, the relation between the LA and BDR 
variables will be further analyzed. 
 
Table 4
Summary Statistics of Sample Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
fb 0 0.04 0 1
roa 0.01 0.02 -0.19 0.84
roe 0.02 0.44 -16.99 5.09
la 0.58 0.18 0 0.98
car 0.12 0.09 -0.08 1
lev 10.12 8.5 -39.53 299.98
blev 267.74 11922.32 0 972518.5
bdr 0.03 0.08 0 1




As shown in Figure 1, there is a strong concentration of financial institutions 
with high LA ratios and low BDR ratios.  Since a high LA ratio is associated with a 
higher probability of failure, it appears that industrial banks are less likely to fail, 
since they have low LA ratios in general.  A basic correlation of the LA and BDR 
variables shows a weak positive relationship between asset growth and use of 
brokered deposits.  The correlation value is 0.12.  It appears that the use of brokered 
deposits is not the driving force of growth for financial institutions in the sample 
analyzed.  This provides evidence against the claims in the FDIC study that the use of 
brokered deposits is associated with strong loan growth followed by high 
delinquencies.  
Three linear regressions were generated to test the correlation between 
failed banks to each variable shown in Table 5.  In the first two regressions, the R-
squared value indicates that only 31% of the variation between the independent 
and dependent variables can be explained with this data sample.  The first 
regression showed that a majority of variables were statistically significant at the 
95% confidence interval.  The only two exceptions were the BLEV and industrial 
bank (IB) variables.  The robust regression was generated to account for 
Heteroskedasticity issues in the original regression.  After the robust regression was 
generated, the number of statistically significant variables was reduced from six 
(ROA, ROE, LA, CAR, LEV, BDR) to four (LA, CAR, LEV and BLEV).  The BLEV variable 
became statistically significant when the robust regression was generated, while the 




Figure 1. Scatterplot of Loans to Assets and Brokered Deposits Ratio 




Variable β (OLS)a β (OLS Robust)b β (Logit)c
roa -0.085* -0.085 -2.3256
roe 0.0085* 0.0085 0.2277
la -0.0166* -0.0166* 6.2692
car 0.0453* 0.0453* -80.9291
lev 0.0033* 0.0033* 0.0441
blev 0 0* -0.0283
bdr 0.0189* 0.0189 4.2141
ib 0.0041 0.0041 (omitted)
Notes: a R 2 = 0.31. b  R 2  = 0.31. c  Pseudo R 2  = 0.80.  * p < .05. n=6,789
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The coefficient sign of the LA variable did not match the expected sign 
indicated in Table 3.  It appears that the higher the percentage of loans to assets, the 
lower the probability of bank failure.  This is a surprising result, considering that 
loan growth is associated with higher exposure to adverse selection, which can 
produce more delinquencies in the long run.  The coefficient of the CAR variable 
appears to support the findings of Adrian and Shin (2010), where higher 
concentrations of capital lead to more aggressive lending in order to utilize the 
available capital surplus.  Banks with higher concentrations of capital are 4% more 
likely to fail.   
The statistical significance of the assets to equity (LEV) variable indicates 
that banks with higher leverage of assets to equity are more likely to fail.  However, 
the low coefficient value does not appear to have a practical significance.  The BLEV 
variable is correlated with a higher incidence of bank failure.  Since this variable is 
related to the use brokered deposits, and considering that the LEV variable is also 
statistically significant, there is evidence against the hypothesis that the use of 
brokered deposits is not related to bank failure.  In other words, there is evidence 
that the use of brokered deposits is related to bank failure.  Since industrial banks 
are primary users of brokered deposits, it appears that an increase in the use of 
brokered deposits, relative to assets, is associated with a higher likelihood of bank 
failure.  
 Finally, when the logistic regression was performed, Stata® dropped the IB 
variable.  Since no industrial bank failed during the last quarter of 2011, there is no 
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evidence that industrial banks can fail in the data used.  However, even without the 















 Based on the regression results, all other things equal, a higher use of 
brokered deposits, relative to overall assets, is associated with a higher likelihood of 
bank failure.  Since industrial banks fund a majority of their loans with brokered 
deposits, the conclusion is that the use of brokered deposits appears to be related to 
riskier loans with the potential to increase bank failures.  However, the lack of bank 
failures in industrial banks during the Great Recession provides evidence of the 
effectiveness of Section 29 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.  Before the 
enactment of Section 29, a high concentration of industrial banks failed during the 
Savings and Loans crisis of the 1980’s. 
The funding restrictions imposed by Section 29 appear to act as a deterrent 
for industrial banks to engage in risky lending practices.  Industrial banks must 
ensure that they remain properly capitalized while not using surplus capital to make 
risky loans.  The surplus capital can be used, instead, to better understand 
customers and, thus, reduce adverse selection problems.  The potential legislative 
effect of these findings could be applied to core deposits as well.  The current 
perception that core deposits are preferred to brokered deposits may be misguided.  
Based on the experience of industrial banks, it is possible to remain profitable even 
in the context of strict regulation in the form of Section 29.  Since industrial banks 
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have clear knowledge of the consequences of being less than well capitalized, the 
correct incentives are in place to reduce bank failures.  The moral hazard issue that 
caused many of the bank failures during the Great Recession can be minimized with 
additional regulation that discourages banks from becoming too big to fail.  
Finally, the particular type of deposit used by a bank, core or brokered, may 
not necessarily correlate with a higher or lower incidence of bank failure.  In fact, 
the regulatory environment can have an even greater effect in promoting the correct 
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